Public company | |
Industry | Mining, colonial enterprises |
---|---|
Fate | Acquired |
Predecessor | Central Search Association and the Exploring Company Ltd. |
Successor | Charter Consolidated Ltd |
Founded | London, United Kingdom (1889) |
Founder | Cecil Rhodes |
Defunct | 1965 |
Headquarters | London , |
Area served | Southern Africa South Africa Botswana Rhodesia Zambia and their predecessor entities |
Cecil Rhodes (founder) |
The British South Africa Company (BSAC or BSACo) was established following the amalgamation of Cecil Rhodes' Central Search Association and the London-based Exploring Company Ltd which had originally competed to exploit the expected mineral wealth of Mashonaland but united because of common economic interests and to secure British government backing. The company received a Royal Charter in 1889 modelled on that of the British East India Company. Its first directors included the Duke of Abercorn, Rhodes himself and the South African financier Alfred Beit. Rhodes hoped BSAC would promote colonisation and economic exploitation across much of south-central Africa, as part of the 'Scramble for Africa'. However, his main focus was south of the Zambezi, in Mashonaland and the coastal areas to its east, from which he believed the Portuguese could be removed by payment or force, and in the Transvaal, which he hoped would return to British control.[1]
It has been suggested that Rhodes' ambition was to create a zone of British commercial and political influence from 'Cape to Cairo', but this was far beyond the resources of any commercial company to achieve and would not have given investors the financial returns they expected. The BSAC was created in the expectation that the gold fields of Mashonaland would provide funds for the development of other areas of Central Africa, including the mineral wealth of Katanga. When the expected wealth of Mashonaland did not materialise and Katanga was acquired by the Congo Free State, the company had little money left for significant development after building railways, particularly in areas north of the Zambezi. BSAC regarded its lands north of the Zambezi as territory to be held as cheaply as possible for future, rather than immediate, exploitation.[2]
As part of administering Southern Rhodesia until 1923 and Northern Rhodesia until 1924, the BSAC formed what were originally paramilitary forces, but which later included more normal police functions. In addition to the administration of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, the BSAC claimed extensive landholdings and mineral rights in both the Rhodesias and, although its land claims in Southern Rhodesia were nullified in 1918, its land rights in Northern Rhodesia and its mineral rights in Southern Rhodesia had to be bought out in 1924 and 1933 respectively, and its mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia lasted until 1964. The BSAC also created the Rhodesian railway system and owned the railways there until 1947.
- 1Corporate History
- 2Territorial acquisitions
- 3Land policies
- 4Railways
- 5Commercial activities
- 5.2Mining
- 6Security
- 7Politics
Corporate History[edit]
Royal charter[edit]
The Royal Charter of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) came into effect on 20 December 1889. This was initially for a period of 25 years, later extended for a further 10 years, so it expired in 1924.[3]
The company had been incorporated in October 1888, and much of the time after Rhodes arrived in London in March 1889 and before its Charter was granted, was taken up in discussions on its terms. In these discussions, Rhodes led the BSAC negotiators. Although the British government broadly supported the scheme, it demanded that it and the High Commissioner for Southern Africa it appointed should have the ultimate responsibility for any territory BSAC might acquire and for approving or rejecting all BSAC actions. Although Clause 3 of the Charter appeared to grant BSAC powers to administer a wide (if unspecified) area of Central Africa on behalf of the British government, this was subject to it obtaining those powers through treaties with local rulers. Under Clauses 4 and 9, the British government also had to accept those treaties and agree to assume any powers to govern that the rulers had granted before authorising BSAC to exercise those powers in its behalf.[4]
Board divisions[edit]
The first board of directors of the British South Africa Company, 1889. Top Row: Horace Farquhar; Albert Grey; Alfred Beit. Middle Row: the Duke of Fife; C. J. Rhodes (Founder and managing director in South Africa); the Duke of Abercorn. Bottom Row: Lord Gifford, V.C.; Herbert Canning(Secretary); George Cawston.
The BSAC was an amalgamation of a London-based group headed by Lord Gifford and George Cawston and backed financially by Baron Nathan de Rothschild, and Rhodes and his South African associates including Alfred Beit with the resources of the De Beers Syndicate and Gold Fields of South Africa. These two groups had originally been in competition but united because of common economic interests. Gifford and Cawston's interests were represented by the Bechuanaland Exploration Company and its offshoot, the Exploring Company. Rhodes and his associates secured the Rudd Concession from the Ndebele king, Lobengula, which was transferred to the Central Search Association (later renamed United Concession Company), and the Exploring Company was given approximately one-quarter of the shares in it. The British South Africa Company leased mineral rights from the Central Search Association, paying it half the net profits from mineral exploitation.[2][5]
From the start, Gifford disliked Rhodes, who he thought had acquired too much power in BSAC and had marginalised him. Cawston supported Rhodes only in those commercial activities likely to make a profit and not in any less commercial ventures. The four other directors were appointed to represent the other shareholders. The dukes of Abercorn and of Fife, respectively chairman and vice-chairman were appointed to give the company prestige but they took little part in running the company. Neither had previous interest in Africa and Fife had no business experience. Albert Grey, later Earl Grey had an active role as a liaison between Rhodes in South Africa and government officials in London. He and Horace Farquhar, a prominent London banker, completed the first Board.[6]
The Jameson Raid and after[edit]
Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, had planned the overthrow of the Transvaal Government in the event of a rising in Johannesburg by British subjects denied civil and political rights as early as 1893, and the Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon, did nothing to discourage this. Loch's successor as High Commissioner from 1895, Sir Hercules Robinson inherited these plans, but none of Loch, Robinson or Ripon took any steps to promote such a rising. Joseph Chamberlain, who succeeded Ripon in 1895, was almost certainly aware that Rhodes was planning a rising, but not the details.[7] Rhodes and Jameson made plans to assist, and probably to promote, a Johannesburg rising. Earl Grey was the only London-based director to know about plans for the Jameson Raid, and he, like Rhodes and Beit, did not share this knowledge with the other BSAC directors. Grey communicated at least some of the plan to Joseph Chamberlain, who avoided specifically endorsing it.[8]
News of the Raid shocked the BSAC directors who, except for Beit and Grey, knew nothing of the plan. Rhodes at first denied responsibility for Jameson's actions but, in the face of further revelations, he assumed full responsibility for them. The BSAC Board recognised that the company would be attacked, and asked Rhodes to come to London to meet them. At a Board meeting of 5 February 1896, Rhodes claimed that he had given Jameson permission to assist an uprising only, not to start one, and that he believed had the support of the British government. He offered to resign as managing director, but a decision on this was deferred despite the demands of Cawston and Gifford for its acceptance. However, after the trial of the Jameson raiders implicated Rhodes further and following pressure from Chamberlain, Rhodes and Beit were removed as directors in June 1896.[9]
After his removal, Rhodes remained a major shareholder in the BSAC and he continued to be involved unofficially in its affairs. In 1898, the Duke of Fife and Lord Farquhar both resigned from the Board; Rhodes and Beit replaced them and another supporter of Rhodes also joined the Board. As Rhodes had recaptured full control over the company, Cawston decided to resign. Lord Gifford, however, remained on the Board, which Rhodes dominated until his death.[10]
After Rhodes[edit]
Rhodes retained effective control of the BSAC until his death in 1902, but after the Jameson Raid the company's relations with the Colonial Office over Rhodesia were difficult, as the Colonial Office was unwilling to recognise the company had to give priority to its commercial interests rather than administration. After Rhodes' death, the BSAC directors attempted to make the company commercially profitable, but until 1924 it was deeply unprofitable because its administrative costs outweighed its commercial income, and it never paid a dividend in that period. After a financial crisis in Britain in 1908, the value of its shares declined sharply: its share capital had to be increased from £6 million to £12 million between 1908 and 1912, and it needed large loans to stay in business.[11]
From around 1920, the company favoured a union of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, followed by their inclusion in the Union of South Africa, and it was in discussion with South African leaders about this. South Africa offered favourable terms for buying out the BSAC's interests, and the company would be relieved of any future administrative costs. The BSAC did not want to be left with responsibility for the administration of Northern Rhodesia when Southern Rhodesia gained responsible government, but did want to preserve its commercial interests there, in particular its mining and land rights. To do this, it had to negotiate a settlement with the British government for both parts of Rhodesia. The two parties began negotiations in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion at the end of 1922, but nevertheless reached an agreement of 29 September 1923 to settle all the outstanding questions on Southern and Northern Rhodesia.[12]
From 1925 until his death in 1937 Sir Henry Birchenough, a former Director of the company, served as President.
After 1924 the BSAC's rights allowed it to collect vast sums in royalties, particularly from the development of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, from the late 1920s until its mineral rights were liquidated just before Zambian independence in 1964. In the 1930s, the BSAC was able to collect royalties on all copper mined and was a large shareholder in the main mining companies. By 1937 its annual mining revenue was £311,000.[13]
Territorial acquisitions[edit]
Rhodesia[edit]
The first stage in acquiring territory was to enter into treaties with local rulers. Although the Ndebele king, Lobengula, had agreed not to enter into a treaty with any other power without prior British consent, and had granted mining concessions to the BSAC (including the right for the company to protect them), he consistently refused to delegate any general powers of government to the British South Africa Company. However, the BSAC convinced the Colonial Office that it should declare a protectorate on the basis that a group of citizens of the Transvaal Republic led by Louis Adendorff planned to cross the Limpopo River to settle and proclaim a republic in Mashonaland. A protectorate was proclaimed by an Order-in-Council of 9 May 1891, initially covering Mashonaland and later Matabeleland. The Adendorff party did attempt to cross the Limpopo in June 1891, but was turned back by a force of the BSAC police.[14][15] Installshield limited edition run batch file.
The Lozi of the Barotseland formed a kingdom whose king, Lewanika had begun his rule in 1876, but had been driven from power in 1884. After his return in 1885, his concerns about further internal power struggles and the threat of Ndebele raids prompted him to seek European protection. He asked François Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, which had set up a mission to the Lozi, to help him draft a petition seeking a British protectorate. This reached the Colonial Office in August 1889, but no immediate action was taken to accept it. Even before this, Cecil Rhodes, while attempting to obtain a Royal Charter for the BSAC, considered Barotseland as a suitable area for company operations and as a gateway to the copper deposits of Katanga.[16] Rhodes sent Frank Lochner to Barotseland to obtain a concession and made an offer to the British government to pay the expenses of a Barotseland protectorate. Lochner sponsored the misconception that BSAC represented the British government, and on 27 June 1890, Lewanika gave his consent to an exclusive mineral concession. This (the Lochner Concession) gave the company mining rights over the whole of the area in which Lewanika was paramount ruler in exchange for an annual subsidy and the promise of British protection, a promise that Lochner had no authority to give. However, the BSAC advised the Foreign Office that the Lozi had accepted British protection.[17]
British South Africa Company stamp used to validate emergency issue currency for use in Bulawayo, authorized by Hugh Marshall Hole.
The Foreign Office had reservations over the nature and extent of the supposed protectorate and it never sanctioned the Lochner Concession, because it did not grant BSAC any administrative rights and it involved monopolies, prohibited in the BSAC Charter.[18] However, in negotiations with the Portuguese government, Barotseland was claimed to fall within the British sphere of influence and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891 allocated the Barotse Kingdom's territory to the British sphere, although the boundary with Angola was not fixed until 1905.[19] Lewanika protested that the terms of the treaty had been misrepresented to him. No BSAC Administrator was sent to Barotseland until 1895, and the first Administrator, Forbes who remained until 1897, did little to establish an administration. As the Foreign Office was not convinced that the Lochner Concession had established a British protectorate over Barotseland or given BSAC any rights to administer the territory, it considered that a new concession was necessary. It agreed in 1896 that a BSAC official would be appointed as Resident Commissioner to secure this concession. The first appointee died before taking up his post, but in October 1897, Robert Coryndon reached Barotseland as Resident Commissioner. Coryndon, a former secretary of Cecil Rhodes and member of the Pioneer Column, had been proposed by the BSAC, and his appointment was approved by the High Commissioner for South Africa as representing the British government. In his capacity as Resident, Coryndon declared Barotseland to be a British protectorate, resolving its previously anomalous position. Coryndon also confirmed that the 1890 mineral concession gave the BSAC no right to make land grants.[20] In 1897 Lewanika signed a new concession (the Coryndon Concession) that gave the BSAC the rights to make land grants and to establish jurisdiction in parallel to the king's courts. Next, in 1900, Lewanika signed a further agreement, (the Barotse Concession), which resolved some details that were in dispute following the earlier concessions and was drafted in terms compatible with the Barotseland-North Western Rhodesia Order in Council, 1899. .[21][22]
Up to 1899, Northern Rhodesia outside of Barotseland was governed according to the Order-in-Council of 9 May 1891, which did not fix clear boundaries to the area involved. Before 1911, Northern Rhodesia was administered as two separate territories, North-Western Rhodesia and North-Eastern Rhodesia. The former was recognised as British territory by the Barotseland and North-Western Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1899 and the later by the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1900. Both Orders-in-Council regularised the position of the BSAC Administrators, the first of whom for North- Eastern Rhodesia was appointed in 1895. In North-Western Rhodesia the first Administrator was appointed for Barotseland in 1897, becoming Administrator for all North-Western Rhodesia in 1900.[23][24]
Other areas[edit]
In 1890, Alfred Sharpe undertook an expedition with the objective of acquiring Katanga. He only managed to make treaties with local rulers in North-Eastern Rhodesia, a number of whom later claimed that the contents of the treaty documents had been misrepresented to them. Katanga became part of the Congo Free State. The boundary between the Congo Free State and British territory was fixed by a treaty in 1894. It was only after this treaty and the appointment of a separate Administrator for North- Eastern Rhodesia in 1895 that the area was brought under effective BSAC control.[25]
The British South Africa Company also considered acquiring interests in Bechuanaland Protectorate and Nyasaland, which was initially called the British Central Africa Protectorate. During negotiations for its charter in 1889, the company discussed the possibilities of taking over the administration of Bechuanaland, which was already a British protectorate, and of working with, and possibly amalgamating with, the African Lakes Company which was operating in Nyasaland. On 29 October 1889, a Royal Charter authorised the formation of the British South Africa Company's Police.[26] In the event, BSAC did not take over the administration of Bechuanaland, but from 1892 it took over the cost of the Bechuanaland Border Police, which from 1896 was merged with the British South Africa Police.[27][28] On 1 Apr 1896 the Bechuanaland Border Police was renamed as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police (BMP).[26]
The African Lakes Company was itself attempting to become a Chartered Company in the late 1880s, and Rhodes discussed its possible amalgamation with the BSAC in 1889. However, the Foreign Office judged the African Lakes Company as unsuitable to administer any territory, and by 1890 BSAC wished to take control of that company rather than amalgamate with it. The Lakes Company directors resisted, but by 1893 they had been ousted. In 1891, the British Central Africa Protectorate was proclaimed on the understanding that the BSAC would contribute to the costs of its administration. However, its Commissioner, Harry Johnson, refused to act as a BSAC appointee, in particular on Rhodes' demand that all Crown lands in the protectorate should be transferred to BSAC control and that Johnson should also facilitate the transfer of African lands to it[29]
Dispute with Portugal[edit]
At the start of the 19th century, effective Portuguese government in Mozambique was limited to the ports of Mozambique Island, Ibo, Quelimane, Sofala, Inhambane and Lourenço Marques and the outposts at Sena and Tete in the Zambezi valley. Although Portugal claimed sovereignty over Angoche and a number of smaller Muslim coastal towns, these were virtually independent.[30][31] In the Zambezi valley, Portugal had also initiated the Prazo system of large leased estates under nominal Portuguese rule. By the end of the 18th century, this area in the valleys of the Zambezi and lower Shire River were controlled by a few families that claimed to be Portuguese subjects but which were virtually independent.[32] In the interior of what is today southern and central Mozambique, there was not even a pretence of Portuguese control. The nadir of Portuguese fortunes was reached in the 1830s and 1840s when Lourenço Marques was sacked in 1833 and Sofala in 1835; Zumbo was abandoned in 1836; Afro-Portuguese settlers near Vila de Sena were forced to pay tribute to the Gaza Empire and Angoche fought off a Portuguese attempt to prevent it from slave-trading in 1847. However, around 1840 the Portuguese government embarked on a series of military campaigns to bring the prazos and the Muslim coastal towns under its effective control.[33][34]
The General Act of the Berlin Conference dated 26 February 1885, which introduced the principle of effective occupation was potentially damaging to Portuguese claims in Mozambique. Article 34 required a power acquiring land on the coasts of Africa outside of its previous possessions to notify the other signatories of the Act so they could protest against such claims. Article 35 of the Act provided that rights could only be acquired over previously uncolonised lands if the power claiming them had established sufficient authority there to protect existing rights and the freedom of trade. This normally implied making treaties with local rulers, establishing an administration and exercising police powers. Initially, Portugal claimed that the Berlin Treaty did not apply, and it was not required to issue notifications or establish effective occupation, as Portugal's claim to the Mozambique coast had existed for centuries and had been unchallenged.[35][36]
However, British officials did not accept this interpretation, as Henry O'Neill, the British consul based at Mozambique Island said in January 1884:
'There is a field of action open to her (England) in South Africa which only a slight political barrier interposes to shut her out from. We refer, of course, to the area of Portuguese rule. This, it is true, at present is an undefinable area. Portugal has been a colonising power only in name. To speak of Portuguese colonies in East Africa is to speak of a mere fiction—a fiction colourably sustained by a few scattered seaboard settlements, beyond whose narrow littoral and local limits colonisation and government have no existence.'[37]
To forestall British designs on the parts of Mozambique and the interior that O'Neill claimed Portugal did not occupy, Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrada was commissioned in 1884 to establish effective occupation, and he was active in four areas. Firstly, in 1884 he established the town of Beira and Portuguese occupation of much of Sofala Province. Secondly, also in 1884, he acquired a concession of an area within a 180 kilometre radius of Zumbo, which had been reoccupied and west of which Afro-Portuguese families had traded and settled since the 1860s. Although Andrada did not establish any administration immediately, in 1889 an outpost was established beyond the junction of the Zambezi and Kafue River and an administrative district of Zumbo was established.[38][39][40] Thirdly, in 1889 Andrada was granted another concession over Manica, which covered the areas both of the Manica Province of Mozambique and the Manicaland Province of Zimbabwe. Andrada succeeded in obtaining treaties over much of this area and establishing a rudimentary administration but he was arrested in November 1890 by British South Africa Company troops and expelled. Finally, also in 1889, Andrada crossed northern Mashonaland, approximately the area of the Mashonaland Central Province of Zimbabwe, obtaining treaties. He failed to inform the Portuguese government of these treaties, so these claims were not formally notified to other powers, as required by the Berlin Treaty. The British government refused to submit any disputed claims to arbitration, and on 11 January 1890, Lord Salisbury sent the British Ultimatum of 1890 to the Portuguese government demanded the withdrawal of the Portuguese troops from the areas where Portuguese and British interests in Africa overlapped.[41]
Fixing boundaries[edit]
The final stage in acquiring territory was to make bi-lateral treaties with other European powers. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891 was an agreement signed in Lisbon on 11 June 1891 between the United Kingdom and Portugal. It fixed the boundaries between the territories administered by the British South Africa Company in Mashonaland and Matabeleland, now parts of Zimbabwe, and North-Eastern Rhodesia (now part of Zambia) and Portuguese Mozambique. It divided Manica, granting the western portion to the British South Africa Company. It also fixed the boundaries between the BSAC-administered territory of North-Western Rhodesia (now in Zambia), and Portuguese Angola.[42][43] The northern border of the British territories was agreed as part of an Anglo-German Convention in 1890. The border between the British Central Africa Protectorate and the territory of the British South Africa Company in what is today Zambia was fixed in 1891 at the drainage divide between Lake Malawi and the Luangwa River.[44]
Early administration[edit]
The terms of the treaties under which the various protectorates were created north or south of the Zambezi provided for the rulers that signed them to retain significant powers over their own people. Despite this, the British South Africa Company either ended the powers of traditional rulers through warfare or eroded them by encouraging its own officials to take most of them over. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, those traditional rulers that remained were restricted to largely ceremonial roles only.[45]
The BSAC appointed an Administrator of Mashonaland, who was intended to have a similar function to a colonial governor, and later assistants in charge of districts. The first Administrator, A. R. Colquhoun, was appointed in October 1890, soon after the Pioneer Column had arrived at Fort Salisbury. As first, the British government refused to recognise Colquhoun, and placed the governor of Bechuanaland in immediate charge of the new protectorate, with the High Commissioner for South Africa given oversight of it. The governor legitimated the Administrator in July 1891 by appointing him Chief Magistrate, and as the British government did not want the expense of administration, it acquiesced to BSAC control. The Administrator, as Chief Magistrate, appointed assistants charged with keeping order in the various parts of Mashonaland, and from these a district administration developed. However, under Colquhoun and his successor from August 1891, Leander Starr Jameson, there were less than 20 administrative staff, mostly inexperienced, so government was minimal.[46][47] As the High Commissioner was usually resident in Cape Town, a Resident Commissioner was appointed to represent him in Rhodesia. The early BSAC Administrators had a dual role, being appointed Administrators by the company and Chief Magistrate by the Crown. Their position was regularised in 1894, when the British government appointed the British South Africa Company to administer what was beginning to be called Rhodesia, which at that time was not split into Northern and Southern sections. A Legislative Council was created in 1898 in Southern Rhodesia to advise the BSAC Administrator and the High Commissioner for South Africa in legal matters.[48][49]
Administration north of the Zambezi was rudimentary before 1901. In North-Eastern Rhodesia, Abercorn and Fife were fortified outposts and the Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia was resident in Blantyre in the British Central Africa Protectorate until Fort Jameson was founded in 1899 as its headquarters. In Barotziland-North-Western Rhodesia, there was no Secretariat until 1901.[50]
Land policies[edit]
Southern Rhodesia[edit]
After the entry of the Pioneer Column into Southern Rhodesia, the provision of land for European settlers was one of the first matters to be taken up by the British South Africa Company. Matabele authority ceased, freehold ownership of land was introduced, and large tracts were acquired by the BSAC for alienation to Europeans.[51] Jameson, who became Administrator of Mashonaland in 1891, was Rhodes' appointee and he executed what he thought were Rhodes' plans with little supervision from Rhodes and none from the BSAC Board in London. Jameson made very large land grants between 1891 and 1893 for little return until the directors' complaints stopped him (although Rhodes' approved several other large grants up to 1896). This policy discouraged later settlers, who could only acquire good quality land at a high price from these grantees.[52]
As English law applied in both in Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, all land that had not already been alienated should in principle have been Crown land. However, in both territories, BSAC claimed ownership of the land not in other private ownership either because it, not the Crown, had conquered it or under the various concessions it had obtained. It also claimed the right to alienate this land as its owner. In 1890 and 1891, the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner accepted that BSAC had obtained title to the land in Mashonaland.[53] After the Matebele wars, the company also claimed in 1894 to have the right to dispose of all land in Matebeleland, on the basis that the Ndebele king, Lobengula had owned it, but had forfeited it. The Colonial Office objected, but only to the extent of requiring BSAC to reserve sufficient lands for the African population.[54]
In 1894, a Land Commission was appointed to deal with the settlement of Africans on the land. The Commission recommended that two large territories be set aside for native occupation, the Shangani and Gwaai Reserves in Matabeleland, of about 2,486,000 acres. Before the arrival of the Europeans, Africans had held nearly 100,000,000 acres in what became Southern Rhodesia. The Land Commission's plan showed such poor judgment, and the bases of allocation were so ill-considered, that the attempt to confine the native population within these two areas was never really practicable. Failure to make suitable provision for African lands may have been one of the prime causes of the Matabele and Mashona rebellions of 1896. Following these rebellions, BSAC was required to assign sufficient land to Southern Rhodesian Africans for their agricultural and pastoral requirements, including access to sufficient water. Native Reserves were set up under this directive, which by 1902 had an estimated indigenous population of 530,000. Although later modifications were made, the basic pattern of land allocation persisted until independence. The European district officers who responsible for defining the reserves were advised to allow between 9 and 15 acres of arable land for each family, and adequate pasture, but they had little geographic knowledge of the country and no maps. In 1910, a Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry was set up, which made very few changes. The Committee's land apportionment was 19 million acres for Europeans and 21.4 million acres for Native Reserves with an African population of about 700,000. A further 51.6 million acres was unassigned, but available for future alienation to Europeans.[55]
In 1918, he Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided in the Southern Rhodesia case that, even although the British South Africa Company may have conquered Mashonaland and Matabeleland, it had acted as an agent of the British Crown, so the land had become Crown land. The court recognised that the indigenous people of what became Southern Rhodesia, had previously owned the land, but had lost it through the BSAC conquest.[56] However, even after the Privy Council decision, the British government allowed BSAC to continue to administer the unalienated lands in Southern Rhodesia and agreed that, when their Charter expired, it was to recover the loss it had incurred in administering the territory either from future sales of these lands or from the British government. In negotiations for the ending of the Charter in 1923, the British government agreed to fund part of this deficit, but placed the obligation to pay off the rest on Southern Rhodesia itself.[57]
In 1920, some smaller reserves were reorganised, and 83 Native Reserves of 21.6 million acres were recognised, which were for the exclusive use and occupation almost 900,000 Africans. Of this total, about 3 million acres were unsuitable for any agricultural use. A review after the end of BSAC administration in 1925 enforced stricter segregation of European and African land, while allowing only a little more land for African use.[58]
Northern Rhodesia[edit]
In Northern Rhodesia, the BSAC claimed ownership of all the unalienated land in the territory, and the right to alienate it. Europeans occupied land along the line of the railway and near the towns, but generally there was no land shortage, as the population density was lower than in Southern Rhodesia, and the European population was much lower. In 1913, BSAC drew up plans for Native Reserves along Southern Rhodesian lines, outside which Africans would have no right to own or occupy land, but these plans were not implemented until 1928, after company administration ended.[59]
The Privy Council decision on Southern Rhodesia raised questions about the BSAC claim to the unalienated lands north of the Zambezi. However, the company's claim in Northern Rhodesia was based on concessions granted rather than conquest and, although a parliamentary Committee in 1921 recommended that these claims also should be referred to the Privy Council, the British government preferred to negotiate an overall settlement for the end of BSAC administration in Northern Rhodesia. This effectively acknowledged the company's claim.[57] Under an Agreement of 29 September 1923, the Northern Rhodesian government took over the entire control of lands previously controlled by BSAC from 1 April 1924, paying the company half the net rents and the proceeds of certain land sales.[60]
Railways[edit]
Railway policies[edit]
The British South Africa Company was responsible for building the Rhodesian railway system in the period of primary construction which ended in 1911, when the main line through Northern Rhodesia reached the Congo border and the Katanga copper mines. Rhodes' original intention was for a railway extending across the Zambesi to Lake Tanganyika, popularly considered as part of a great 'Cape to Cairo' railway linking all the British colonies of Africa. Rhodes was as much a capitalist in his motivation as a visionary, and when little gold was found in Mashonaland, he accepted that even the scheme to reach Lake Tanganyika had no economic justification. Railways built by private companies without government subsidies need enough of the type of traffic that can pay high freight rates to recover their construction costs. The agricultural products that fuelled much of Rhodesia's early economic growth could not provide this traffic; large quantities of minerals could. Most early railways in Africa were built by the British government rather than Chartered Companies. The need to raise capital and produce dividends prevented most Chartered Companies from undertaking such infrastructure investments. However, in the early period of railway construction, the BSAC obtained finance from South African companies including Consolidated Gold Fields and De Beers in which Rhodes was a dominant force. BSAC also benefitted from the large, but not unlimited personal fortunes of Rhodes and Beit before their deaths.[61][62]
Development of routes[edit]
Lord Gifford and his Bechuanaland Exploring Company had won the right to construct a private railway north from the terminus of the Cape Government Railways at Kimberley into Bechuanaland in 1888. Rhodes was initially against this extension, in part because Gifford was a competitor but also for reasons of Cape politics. However, when Rhodes and Gifford joined forces, BSAC had to take on this railway obligation to gain its Charter. Rhodes promised that BSAC would spend £500,000 on building a railway through Bechuanaland, half of BSAC's total initial share capital. The railway reached Vryburg in 1890, stopping there until 1893 because of the poor financial state of BSAC and disappointing reports about gold in Mashonaland and Matabeleland. BSAC remained cautious about railway building until 1896, when African uprisings threatening its investment made railway links to Southern Rhodesia imperative.[63]
The line from Kimberley reached Bulawayo in 1897, and a connection to Salisbury was completed in 1902. By then Southern Rhodesia already had a rail outlet to the Mozambican port of Beira. This was completed by the Beira Railway Company, a subsidiary company of the BSAC, as a narrow gauge railway as far as Umtali in 1898. In the next year, a line from Salisbury to Umtali was completed which, like the Kimberley to Bulawayo line, was at the Cape gauge of 3 feet 6 inches. The Umtali to Beira section was widened to Cape gauge in 1899 and 1900. These lines were proposed before the economic potential of the Rhodesias was fully known, and in the hope that the expected gold discoveries would promote economic development. Rhodesia's gold deposits proved disappointing, and it was the coal of Wankie that first provided the traffic and revenue to fund railway construction to the north. After the discovery of its huge coal reserves, a branch to Wankie from the main line from Bulawayo (which had been extended to cross the Victoria Falls in 1902) was completed in 1903.[62][64]
The next section was to Broken Hill, which the railway reached in 1906. BSAC was assured that there would be much traffic from its lead and zinc mines, but this did not materialise because technical mining problems. The railway could not meet the costs of the construction loans, and the company faced major financial problems, which were already serious because of the cost of widening the Beira railway. The only area likely to generate sufficient mineral traffic to relieve these debts was Katanga. Initially, the Congo Free State had concluded that Katanga's copper deposits were not rich enough to justify the capital cost of building a railway to the coast, but expeditions between 1899 and 1901 proved their value. Copper deposits found in Northern Rhodesia before the First World War proved uneconomic to develop.[65]
In 1906 Union Minière du Haut Katanga was formed to exploit the Katanga mines. King Leopold favoured a railway route entirely in Congolese territory, linked to the Congo River. An Angolan railway from Lobito Bay to Katanga was also proposed, but in 1908, the BSAC agreed with Leopold to continuing the Rhodesian railway to Elizabethville and the mines. Between 1912, when full-scale copper production began, until 1928 when a Congolese line was completed, almost all of Katanga's copper was shipped over the Rhodesian network to Beira. Even after the Congo route was opened, up to a third of Katanga's copper went to Beira, and the mine's the supply of coal and coke mostly came from Wankie, the cheapest available source. This railway's revenue from Katanga enabled it to carry agricultural produce at low rates. Large-scale development of the Copperbelt only began in the late 1920s, with an increasing world market for copper. Transport was no problem as only short branches had to be built to connect the Copperbelt to the main line. The Beira route was well established and the BSAC wanted to prevent the Copperbelt companies taking advantage of other routes it did not control. The Benguela Railway to Angola, completed in 1931, provided the shortest, most direct route for copper from both Katanga and Northern Rhodesia, but it was never used to full capacity because both the Congo and the Rhodesias restricted its traffic in favour of their own lines.[66]
When the BSAC administration of the Rhodesias was terminated, an agreement between the Colonial Secretary and the company of 29 September 1923 recognised that BSAC was entitled to protection because of the size of its railway investment in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The agreement required the governors of each territory to refer any Bill authorising the construction of new railways or altering the rates that the existing railways charged to the Colonial Secretary. This prevented the legislatures of Northern or Southern Rhodesia from introducing competition or exerting pressure on the BSAC-controlled railways to reduce rates without British government sanction.[67]
Railways and the settlers[edit]
Africa Limited By British Primary Source Store
European settlers had two main criticisms of British South Africa Company railway policy. Firstly, that its financial arrangements unfairly benefited the company and its shareholders, and secondly, that the settlers paid for these benefits through exorbitant railway rates. Although the allegations were probably ill-founded, they caused tensions between the settlers and the BSAC. On the shorter east coast route from Beira, running expenses were high because of construction debts and because the Mozambique Company, which was granted the original concession to build the railway in 1891, imposed a transit duty of up to 3% on goods destined for Rhodesia in return for the sub-concession to the Beira Railway Company. From 1914, the European settlers had a majority in the Advisory Council, and called for the replacement of BSAC control of the railways through nationalisation. In 1923 responsible government was achieved, but rather outright nationalisation, the settler government opted for a form of public control under the Railway Act of 1926. This left BSAC as owner of the railways, which were called Beira and Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways until 1927, and Rhodesia Railways Limited after. This remained the situation until 1947, when the Rhodesian Government acquired the assets of Rhodesia Railways Limited.[68]
Commercial activities[edit]
Early trading[edit]
The company was empowered to trade with African rulers such as King Lobengula; to form banks; to own, manage and grant or distribute land, and to raise a police force (the British South Africa Police). In return, the company agreed to develop the territory it controlled, to respect existing African laws, to allow free trade within its territory and to respect all religions. Rhodes and the white settlers attracted to the company's territory set their sights for ever more mineral rights and more territorial concessions from the African peoples, establishing their own governments, and introducing laws with little concern or respect for African laws. The BSAC was not able to generate enough profit to pay its shareholders dividends until after it lost direct administrative control over Rhodesia in 1923.
Africa from Cairo to the Cape (according to Cecil Rhodes)
Mining[edit]
BSAC claims[edit]
Initially, the British South Africa Company claimed mineral rights in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. During the period of its Charter, the BSAC was not involved in mining directly, but received mineral royalties and held shares in mining companies. Often the main source of income of these companies was not in mining itself but in speculation markets.[69] In Moshanaland, complaints arose at the delay of development of mines in order to fuel speculation profits further.[70]
In 1923, the British government agreed that it would take over the administration of both Southern and Northern Rhodesia from BSAC. The Agreement for Southern Rhodesia provided that the Company's mineral rights there should be granted protection, and any Bill under which the Southern Rhodesian legislature proposed to alter arrangements for collecting mining revenues or imposing any new tax or duty on minerals would require British government. The same condition applied to any Northern Rhodesian legislation.[71] In 1933, the company sold its mineral exploration rights south of the Zambezi to the Southern Rhodesian government, but retained its rights in Northern Rhodesian mineral rights, as well as the its interests in mining, railways, real estate and agriculture across southern Africa.[72]
BSAC claimed to own mineral rights over the whole of Northern Rhodesia under one series of concessions granted between 1890 and 1910 by Lewanika covering a poorly defined area of Barotziland-North-Western Rhodesia, and under a second series negotiated by Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe in 1890 and 1891 with local chiefs covering a disputed area of North-Eastern Rhodesia. This claim was accepted by the British Government.[73] After the Charter ended, BSAC joined a group of nine South African and British companies which financed the development of Nchanga Mines, to prevent them falling under US control. However, its main concern was to receive royalties.[74]
Ancient surface copper workings were known at Kansanshi (near Solwezi), Bwana Mkubwa and Luanshya, all on what later became known as the Copperbelt, and BSAC exploration in the 1890s indicated there were significant deposits in the area. However, they could not be commercially exploited until a railway had been built. A railway bridge across the Zambezi was constructed in 1903 and the line was continued northward, reaching Broken Hill in 1906, where the lead and zinc vanadium mine was opened, and reaching the Belgian Congo border in 1909. At that time, mining had started in Katanga, where rich copper oxide ores occurred near the surface. In Northern Rhodesia, the surface ores were of poorer quality, and copper was only worked intermittently at Bwana Mkubwa, until in 1924 rich copper sulphide ores were discovered about 100 feet below the surface.[75]
In 1922, the Southern Rhodesian voters rejected the option of inclusion in the Union of South Africa and opted for responsible government: the Northern Rhodesian settlers were not consulted. The BSAC wanted to give up responsibility for administering Northern Rhodesia, but to preserve its mining and land rights by negotiating a settlement with the British government for both parts of Rhodesia. For Northern Rhodesia, the most important provision of that agreement was that the Crown would recognise that BSAC was the owner of the mineral rights acquired under the concessions obtained from Lewanika in North Western Rhodesia Certificates of Claim issued by Harry Johnston in North Eastern Rhodesia.[76]
Under the Northern Rhodesian settlement, the company dropped its claim for reimbursement of a £l.6 million administrative deficit: in return the British Government agreed to give the BSAC half the net revenue from certain rents and land sales and recognised (or appeared to recognise) the company as the owner of Northern Rhodesia's mineral rights in perpetuity. The British Government could have bought out these rights by paying BSAC £l.6 million to meet its reimbursement claim, but declined to make the money available. This agreement was criticised then and later time by both African and European inhabitants of the territory. The elected unofficial members of the Legislative Council pressed for the royalties issue to be referred to the Privy Council, as the BSAC's title to unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia had been. Instead, for forty years up to Zambian independence, successive British Governments recognised the BSAC as owner of all underground minerals in Northern Rhodesia, and compelled anyone mining them to pay royalties to the company.[77]
In 1923, the Northern Rhodesian copper industry was little developed, and the British government did not anticipate the future value of these mineral rights. It regarded them as a not very important part of the overall deal with the company. The lack of any challenge to the BSAC's claims and the decision not to refer them to the Privy Council led to suspicion that the company received favoured treatment. There were family links between a junior Colonial Office minister and the BSAC director leading its negotiations, but no evidence to suggest this led to any bias. The most probable explanation is that the importance of the minerals was overlooked in the haste to achieve a settlement. Because of lack of time, the agreement was not approved by the Attorney-General.[78]
The 1923 Agreement stated that the Crown recognised British South Africa Company mineral rights acquired under the concessions either from Lewanika in Barotziland-North-Western Rhodesia or under Certificates of Claim in North-Eastern Rhodesia. These concessions did not cover all of Northern Rhodesia. In particular, they could not have conveyed mineral rights in the area of the Copperbelt from which most of the BSAC's royalties came, as the Copperbelt was outside these areas. However, the British Government had legal advice that the Colonial Office's recognition of the BSAC's rights in practice over a long period, and specific recognition of those rights in Rhodesia mining legislation, prevented it from challenging the rights.[79]
Claims disputed[edit]
The first attempts to challenge BSAC royalty claims were made by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia between 1935 and 1937. The Governor, Sir Hubert Young, attempted to convince the Colonial Office that BSAC only owned mineral rights in the areas of the concessions from Lewanika and the Certificates of Claim from Johnston. This excluded most of the Copperbelt, as the area east of the Kafue River had never been ruled by Lewanika. The Colonial Office response was that BSAC ownership of mineral rights throughout Northern Rhodesia had been accepted in practice, and the references to the Lewanika concessions and Certificates of Claim should not be interpreted in a narrow sense.[80]
Northern Rhodesian settler politicians were not convinced by the Colonial Office arguments, in particular the suggestion that, since the British government had previously recognised the BSAC claims, it could not challenge them now on the basis of a reinterpretation of terms of the 1923 agreement. Settler representatives proposed either that the BSAC mineral rights should be bought out or that punitive levels of tax should be imposed on BSAC royalties. After years of BSAC obstruction, the company was forced to agree in 1950 that it would surrender their mineral rights in 1986 without compensation, and meanwhile give 20% of its royalties to the Northern Rhodesian government.[81]
The 1950 agreement continued through the period of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but at the end of Federation in 1963 the African leaders of what became Zambia sought its revision, proposing to buy out the British South Africa Company's mineral rights for a lump sum. The BSAC refused, and the Northern Rhodesian government of Kenneth Kaunda commissioned a full legal enquiry into the validity of the company's claims. The results were published as a White Paper which considered the validity of commercial rights held and exercised under the colonial legislative and administrative system.[82]
The Northern Rhodesian government argued that many of the treaties on which BSAC relied were of doubtful validity and probably could not have effectively transferred mineral rights. Even if the treaties were valid, none if them covered the Copperbelt, and any subsequent agreements merely confirmed the company's rights if they were originally valid: they did not give the treaties retrospective validity. It further argued that, as the British government had wrongly allowed the BSAC to claim royalties it was not entitled to, the British government should pay any compensation it thought the company was due, and not place this burden on an independent Zambia. Shortly before the planned date for independence of 24 October 1964, Kaunda threatened to expropriate the BSAC immediately afterwards if no agreement were reached. On 23 October, BSAC agreed to give up any mineral rights it might have in return for compensation of £4 million, the British and Zambian governments paying half each.[83]
Financial returns[edit]
Traders of B.S.A.C stock profited handsomely from the speculative trading of the stock which was trading for multiple times higher that its nominal book value on the LSE and the Rhodesian Stock Exchange which was initiated in the Masonic Assembly Room on 20 June 1894.[84]A History of the Zimbabwean Stock ExchangeAn investor who invested in the original one million shares at £1 each and participated in each rights issue up to 1904, would have paid an average of £1.66 for each share. No dividends were received before 1924, but from then the average annual dividend for the next 26 years was 7.5 pence, a poor rate of return. However, from 1950, dividend rates increased sharply, reaching 75 pence a share in 1960, largely from Northern Rhodesian copper royalties. Each share was split two-for-one in 1955 and each of the new shares was exchanged for three Charter Consolidated shares at the beginning of 1965.[85]
Security[edit]
Clause 3 of the BSAC Charter allowed the company to obtain powers necessary for the preservation of public order in, or for the protection of, the territories comprised in its concessions, and Clause 10 allowed the company to establish and maintain a police force.[3] This did not permit the formation of an army but BSAC created a paramilitary force of mounted infantrymen in 1889 which was virtually its army and which allowed it to defeat and replace the Matabele kingdom and then overcome resistance of the Shona north of the Limpopo river in the First Matabele War and Second Matabele War. It was the first British use of the Maxim gun in combat (causing five thousand Ndebele casualties). The company carved out and administered a territory which it named Zambezia, and later, Rhodesia, which now covers the area occupied by the republics of Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Southern Rhodesia[edit]
At first, the BSAC force was named the British South Africa Company's Police, but from 1896 it was called the British South Africa Police. The Colonial Office initially authorised a force of 100 men, but Rhodes increased this to 480 before the Pioneer Column entered Mashonaland.[86] Its numbers had risen to 650 men by the end of 1890, an unsustainable burden on the BSAC resources. Rhodes ordered a reduction in its manpower to 100 at the end of 1891, and later to only 40 men. This was supplemented by the Mashonaland Horse, an unpaid volunteer force of up to 500 men. The police force was greatly increased in size at the time of the First Matabele War, although much if this increase was in the form of volunteer police reservists.[87]
Although the police force had been created by the BSAC and was at first under the command of a company official, after the Jameson Raid it was renamed the British South Africa Police and ceased to be a company force. From then, it reported to the British High Commissioner for South Africa, not the BSAC, and was commanded by a British-appointed officer. This British South Africa Police had four divisions: two policed the countryside (but not the towns) of Matabeleland and of Mashonaland, another covered 'North Zambesia' until the creation of the Barotse Native Police in 1899 and the fourth dealt with Bechuanaland until its own police force was formed in 1903. Also in 1903, the previously separate urban police forces were combined as the Southern Rhodesia Constabulary and handed over to BSAC control. In 1909, the Matabeleland and Mashonaland divisions were handed back to BSAC control and the separate urban police force was amalgamated with the British South Africa Police. Only in 1909 did the British South Africa Police constitute a police force for the whole of Southern Rhodesia and for Southern Rhodesia only. The British South Africa Police was initially formed as a wholly European force, but in 1903 an African unit was organised as the British South African Native Police. In 1909, this was merged into the British South Africa Police, which thereafter had an increasing number of African police officers. The volunteer forces raised for the Matabele wars and Mashona rebellion were disbanded soon after, but the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers, raised for service in the Boer War, remained in being and in 1914 formed the basis of the 1st and 2nd Rhodesia Regiments. Although these were severely reduced in size after the First World War, they formed the basis of the Rhodesian Territorial Force, set up in 1926 after the end of BSAC administration.[28]
Northern Rhodesia[edit]
The BSAC considered that its territory north of the Zambezi was more suitable for a largely African police force than a European one. However, at first the British South Africa Police patrolled the north of the Zambezi in North Western Rhodesia, although its European troops were expensive and prone to diseases. This force and its replacements were paramilitaries, although there was a small force of European civil police in the towns. The British South Africa Police were replaced by the Barotse Native Police force, which was formed in 1902 (other sources date this as 1899 or 1901). This had a high proportion of European NCOs as well as all European officers and was merged into the Northern Rhodesia Police in 1911. Initially, Harry Johnson in the British Central Africa Protectorate had responsibility for North Eastern Rhodesia and Central Africa forces, including Sikh and African troops, were used there until 1899. Until 1903, local magistrates recruited their own local police, but in that year a North Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary was formed, which had only a few white officers, all its NCOs and troopers being African. This was also merged into the Northern Rhodesia Police in 1912, which then numbered only 18 European and 775 African in six companies, divided between the headquarters of the various districts. The Northern Rhodesia Police remained after the end of BSAC administration.[88][89]
Medal[edit]
In 1896, Queen Victoria sanctioned the issue by the British South Africa Company of a medal to troops who had been engaged in the First Matabele War. In 1897, the Queen sanctioned another medal for those engaged in the two campaigns of the Second Matabele War: Rhodesia (1896) and Mashonaland (1897). The government of Southern Rhodesia re-issued the medal to commemorate the earlier 1890 Pioneer Column, in 1927.
The arms of the British South Africa Company
Politics[edit]
Legislature and administration[edit]
A legislative council for Southern Rhodesia was created in 1898 to advise the BSAC Administrator and the High Commissioner for South Africa on legal matters. Initially, this had a minority of elected seats, and the electorate was formed almost exclusively of those better-off white settlers who held BSAC shares. Over time as more settlers arrived, disputes between settlers and BSAC grew, and the company attempted to keep these in check by extending the franchise to some non-shareholders. However, in 1914, the Royal Charter was renewed on condition that settlers in Southern Rhodesia were given increased political rights, and from 1914, there was an elected majority on the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council.[90][91]
In Northern Rhodesia, there was neither an Executive Council nor a legislative council, but only an Advisory Council, which until 1917 consisted entirely of officials. After 1917 and a few nominees were added to represent the small European minority: Northern Rhodesia had no elected representation while under BSAC rule.[92] Provision for elected unofficial members was only made after BSAC rule there came to an end in 1924. In both parts of Rhodesia, the BSAC Administrators were required to submit all draft Proclamations affecting Europeans to the High Commissioner for South Africa for approval before they were issued. The High Commissioner could in theory, and subject to certain restrictions, also make, alter or repeal Proclamations for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and for the peace, order and good government of either territory, without reference to their Administrators, although this power was never used.[93][94]
The British South Africa Company was planning to centralise the administration of the two Rhodesias at the time of the Jameson Raid in 1896. Following the raid, the British government increased its oversight of BSAC affairs in Southern Rhodesia, and insisted on a separate administration in Northern Rhodesia. In both 1915 and 1921, BSAC again failed to set up a single administration for both Rhodesias. In part, this was because the Southern Rhodesian settlers feared that it more would be difficult for a united Rhodesian state to achieve responsible government.[95]
Self-government[edit]
In 1917, the Responsible Government Association was formed as a political party to press for responsible government, and fought the 1920 Legislative Council election in opposition to those advocating union with the Union of South Africa. When the British courts decided that the ultimate ownership of all land which had not already been alienated into private ownership lay with the Crown, not with BSAC, the campaign a self-government gained strength.[96]
In 1921, General Smuts and his government wished for the early admission of Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa. When the Union was established, Natal and the Free State were given representation in the Union Parliament considerably in excess of the number of their electors, and Smuts promised that this would apply in the case of Rhodesia, which would receive 12 to 15 seats in the Union Parliament, which then had 134 members. Smuts also promised that South Africa would make the financial provision necessary to buy out the commercial rights of the BSAC. If those rights continued under responsible government, they would create a serious financial problem for that government. In 1922, the company entered negotiations with the Union government for the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia. However, as the BSAC charter was due to expire in 1924, a referendum was held in 1922 in which the electorate was given a choice between responsible government and entry into the Union of South Africa. Those in favour of responsible government won a significant, but not overwhelming, majority. In 1923, the British government chose not to renew the Company's charter, and instead accorded self-governing colony status to Southern Rhodesia and protectorate status to Northern Rhodesia.[97]
The end of BSAC administration[edit]
An agreement of 29 September 1923 between the British South Africa Company and the Colonial Secretary settled the outstanding issues relating to Southern and Northern Rhodesia. It terminated the company's administration of Northern Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company as from 1 April 1924: Northern Rhodesia continued to be a protectorate, but now governed by a Governor. All laws were to continue in force, and all rights reserved to indigenous peoples under treaties they had made with BSAC also continued in force. From 1 April 1924, control of all lands that the company claimed in Northern Rhodesia, were taken over by the Northern Rhodesian administration, to administer in the interests of their African populations, but BSAC were to receive half the net rents from these lands.[98]
Merger[edit]
In 1964, the company handed over its mineral rights to the government of Zambia, and the following year, the business of the British South Africa Company was merged with the Central Mining & Investment Corporation Ltd and The Consolidated Mines Selection Company Ltd into the mining and industrial business of Charter Consolidated Ltd, of which slightly over one-third of the shares were owned by the British/South African mining company Anglo American plc. In the 1980s the company disposed of its overseas mining concerns to concentrate on its British engineering interests.
In 1993 Charter Consolidated Ltd changed its name to Charter plc, and in 2008 to Charter Limited, which is incorporated in England and Wales, Company Number 02794949. The British South Africa Company still exists, and is registered as a non-trading business incorporated in England and Wales, Company Number ZC000011.
Gazettes published by the company[edit]
See also[edit]
- Ellis Robins, 1st Baron Robins - Lord Robins
- Sir Henry BirchenoughGCMG
References[edit]
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 88, 90.
- ^ abJ S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 87, 202–3.
- ^ ab'Charter of the British South Africa Company'. Archived from the original on 22 October 2013. Retrieved 10 May 2013.
- ^A Keppel-Jones (1983) Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884–1902, pp. 112–3, 133–6, 315.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1970). The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid, pp. 146–7.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1970). The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid, pp. 114, 116–7.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 145–6.
- ^P J S Galbraith, (1970). The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid, pp. 148–9.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1970). The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid, pp. 154–7.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1970). The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid, p. 159.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 366, 371–2.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 370–2.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 367, 374.
- ^A Keppel-Jones (1983) Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884–1902, pp. 176, 315–6.
- ^D N Beach, (1971). The Adendorff Trek in Shona History, pp. 30–2.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 101–3.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 211–5, 217–9.
- ^Government of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). (1964). White Paper on British South Africa Company's claims to Mineral Royalties, p. 1140.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 222–3.
- ^G L Caplan, (1970). The Elites of Barotseland, 1878–1969: A Political History of Zambia's Western Province, pp. 65–7.
- ^G L Caplan, (1970). The Elites of Barotseland, 1878–1969: A Political History of Zambia's Western Province, pp. 75–6.
- ^P E N Tindall, (1967). A History of Central Africa, p. 133.
- ^P E N Tindall, (1967). A History of Central Africa, p. 134.
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- ^G Macola, (2002) The Kingdom of Kazembe: History and Politics in North-Eastern Zambia and Katanga to 1950, pp. 161–4.
- ^ abAndrew Field. 'An Abbreviated History of the British South Africa Police'. Retrieved 13 November 2017.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 109–11, 116.
- ^ abR.S. Roberts, (1974) Towards a History of Rhodesia's Armed Forces, Rhodesian History, vol. 5.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 97–8, 207, 230–3.
- ^M Newitt, (1995). A History of Mozambique, pp. 129, 137, 159–63.
- ^R Oliver and A Atmore, (1986). The African Middle Ages, 1400–1800, pp. 163–4, 191, 195.
- ^M Newitt, (1969). The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo system, pp. 67–8.
- ^M Newitt, (1995). A History of Mozambique, pp. 260, 274–5, 282, 287.
- ^M Newitt, (1969). The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo system, pp. 80–2.
- ^A Keppel-Jones (1983) Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884–1902, pp 190–1.
- ^General Act of the Berlin Conference.
- ^Quoted in J C Paiva de Andrada, (1885). Relatorio de uma viagem ás terras dos Landins, at Project Gutenberg
- ^J C Paiva de Andrada, (1886). Relatorio de uma viagem ás terras do Changamira, at Project Gutenberg
- ^J C Paiva de Andrada, (1885). Relatorio de uma viagem ás terras dos Landins
- ^M Newitt, (1995). A History of Mozambique, pp. 337–8, 344.
- ^M Newitt, (1995). A History of Mozambique, pp. 345–7.
- ^M Newitt, (1995). A History of Mozambique, pp. 341–7, 353–4. ISBN1-85065-172-8
- ^Teresa Pinto Coelho, (2006). Lord Salisbury's 1890 Ultimatum to Portugal and Anglo-Portuguese Relations, pp. 6–7.
- ^J G Pike, (1969). Malawi: A Political and Economic History, pp. 86–7.
- ^R I Rotberg, (1965). The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964, pp. 21–3.
- ^A Keppel-Jones (1983) Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884–1902, pp. 318–9.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, p. 261.
- ^A Keppel-Jones (1983) Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884–1902, pp. 318–9, 321–4.
- ^E A Walker, (1963). The Cambridge History of the British Empire: South Africa, Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories, pp. 682–4.
- ^R. I. Rotberg, (1965). The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa : The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964, p. 25.
- ^B N Floyd, (1962). Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia, p. 572.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 277–81.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 319–21, 323.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 337–8.
- ^B N Floyd, (1962). Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia, pp. 573–4.
- ^J Gilbert, (2006). Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights Under International Law: From Victims to Actors, pp. 18–19.
- ^ abMemorandum by the Colonial Secretary on Rhodesia, 19 April 1923.
- ^B N Floyd, (1962). Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia, p. 574.
- ^R I Rotberg, (1965). The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa : The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964, p. 37.
- ^G. D. Clough, (1924). The Constitutional Changes in Northern Rhodesia and Matters Incidental to the Transition, p. 281.
- ^J Lunn, (1992). The Political Economy of Primary Railway Construction in the Rhodesias, 1890–1911, pp. 239, 244.
- ^ abS Katzenellenbogen, (1974). Zambia and Rhodesia: Prisoners of the Past: A Note on the History of Railway Politics in Central Africa, pp. 63–4.
- ^J Lunn, (1992). The Political Economy of Primary Railway Construction in the Rhodesias, 1890–1911, pp. 240–1
- ^M Newitt, (1995). A History of Mozambique, pp. 395, 402.
- ^S Katzenellenbogen, (1974). Zambia and Rhodesia: Prisoners of the Past: A Note on the History of Railway Politics in Central Africa, p. 64.
- ^S Katzenellenbogen, (1974). Zambia and Rhodesia: Prisoners of the Past: A Note on the History of Railway Politics in Central Africa, pp. 65–6.
- ^G. D. Clough, (1924). The Constitutional Changes in Northern Rhodesia and Matters Incidental to the Transition, p. 282.
- ^J Lunn, (1992). The Political Economy of Primary Railway Construction in the Rhodesias, 1890–1911, pp. 250, 252–4.
- ^Phimister, Ian (18 February 2015). 'Late nineteenth-century globalization: London and Lomagundi perspectives on mining speculation in southern Africa, 1894–1904'. Journal of Global History. 10 (1): 27–52. doi:10.1017/S1740022814000357.
- ^Rhodesia Herald, 6 April 1894
- ^G. D. Clough, (1924). The Constitutional Changes in Northern Rhodesia and Matters Incidental to the Transition, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, p. 282.
- ^A G Hopkins, (1976). Imperial Business in Africa. Part I: Sources, p.31.
- ^Government of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). (1964). White Paper on British South Africa Company's claims to Mineral Royalties, pp. 1135, 1138.
- ^S Cunningham, (1981). The Copper Industry in Zambia: Foreign Mining Companies in a Developing Country, pp. 57–8.
- ^R W Steel, (1957) The Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia, pp. 83–4.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, PP. 371–3.
- ^Government of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), (1964). White Paper on British South Africa Company's claims to Mineral Royalties, pp. 1134–5.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 372–3.
- ^Government of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), (1964). White Paper on British South Africa Company's claims to Mineral Royalties, pp. 1138–9.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 375–6.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 377–8.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 380–1.
- ^P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, pp. 382–3.
- ^George Karekwaivenani, A History of the Rhodesian Stock Exchange, p.14 .
- ^T Lloyd, (1972). Africa and Hobson's Imperialism, p. 144.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 143–6, 149.
- ^J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, pp. 262–3.
- ^L H Gann, (1958). The Birth of a Plural Society: The Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company, 1894–1914, pp. 67, 74–5, 106–7.
- ^J G Pike, (1969). Malawi: A Political and Economic History, pp. 87, 90–2.
- ^P E N Tindall, (1967). A History of Central Africa, Praeger p. 267.
- ^E A Walker, (1963). The Cambridge History of the British Empire: South Africa, Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories, pp. 682, 684–5.
- ^R. I. Rotberg, (1965). The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa : The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964, p. 26.
- ^G. D. Clough, (1924). The Constitutional Changes in Northern Rhodesia and Matters Incidental to the Transition, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Third Series, Vol. 6, No. 4 pp. 279–80.
- ^E A Walker, (1963). The Cambridge History of the British Empire: South Africa, Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories, p. 686.
- ^H. I Wetherell, (1979) Settler Expansionism in Central Africa: The Imperial Response of 1931 and Subsequent Implications, pp. 211–2.
- ^R Blake, (1977). A History of Rhodesia, p. 179.
- ^E A Walker, (1963). The Cambridge History of the British Empire: South Africa, Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories, pp. 690–1.
- ^G. D. Clough, (1924). The Constitutional Changes in Northern Rhodesia and Matters Incidental to the Transition, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Third Series, Vol. 6, No. 4 p. 281.
Sources[edit]
- D N Beach, (1971). The Adendorff Trek in Shona History, South African Historical Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1.
- R Blake, (1977). A History of Rhodesia, New York, Knopf. ISBN0-394-48068-6.
- G. D. Clough, (1924). The Constitutional Changes in Northern Rhodesia and Matters Incidental to the Transition, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Third Series, Vol. 6, No. 4.
- F R Burnham, (1926). Scouting on Two Continents, LC call number: DT775 .B8 1926.
- G L Caplan, (1970). The Elites of Barotseland, 1878–1969: A Political History of Zambia's Western Province, University of California Press. ISBN978-0-52001-758-0
- S Cunningham, (1981). The Copper Industry in Zambia: Foreign Mining Companies in a Developing Country, Praeger.
- B N Floyd, (1962). Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia Geographical Review, Vol. 52, No. 4.
- J S Galbraith, (1970). The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1.
- J S Galbraith, (1974). Crown and Charter: The early Years of the British South Africa Company, University of California Press. ISBN978-0-52002-693-3.
- L H Gann, (1958). The Birth of a Plural Society: The Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company, 1894–1914, Manchester University Press.
- P Gibbs, H Phillips and N Russell, (2009). 'Blue & Old Gold' – The History of the British South Africa Police 1889–1980 30 Degrees South Publishers. ISBN978-1920143-35-0.
- J Gilbert, (2006). Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights Under International Law: From Victims to Actors, BRILL, pp. 18–19. ISBN978-1-571-05369-5
- Government of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), (1964). White Paper on British South Africa Company's claims to Mineral Royalties, International Legal Materials, Vol. 3, No. 6.
- T Lloyd, (1972). Africa and Hobson's Imperialism, Past & Present, No. 55.
- A G Hopkins, (1976). Imperial Business in Africa. Part I: Sources, The Journal of African History, Vol. 17, No. 1.
- S Katzenellenbogen, (1974). Zambia and Rhodesia: Prisoners of the Past: A Note on the History of Railway Politics in Central Africa, African Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 290.
- A Keppel-Jones (1983) Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884–1902, McGill-Queen's Press. ISBN978-0-773-56103-8.
- J Lunn, (1992). The Political Economy of Primary Railway Construction in the Rhodesias, 1890–1911, The Journal of African History, Vol. 33, No. 2.
- G Macola, (2002) The Kingdom of Kazembe: History and Politics in North-Eastern Zambia and Katanga to 1950, LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN978-3-825-85997-8
- M Newitt, (1995). A History of Mozambique, Hurst & Co. ISBN1-85065-172-8
- M Newitt, (1969). The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo system, Journal of African History Vol X, No 1.
- J G Pike, (1969). Malawi: A Political and Economic History, Pall Mall.
- R K Rasmussen and S C Rubert, (1990). A Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe, Scarecrow Press, Inc.
- R. I. Rotberg, (1965). The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa : The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University Press.
- P Slinn, (1971). Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890–1964, African Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 281.
- R W Steel, (1957) The Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia, Geography, Vol. 42, No. 2
- P E N Tindall, (1967). A History of Central Africa, Praeger.
- E.A. Walker, (1963). The Cambridge History of the British Empire: South Africa, Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories, Cambridge University Press.
- H. I Wetherell, (1979). Settler Expansionism in Central Africa: The Imperial Response of 1931 and Subsequent Implications, African Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 311.
External links[edit]
- Documents and clippings about British South Africa Company in the 20th Century Press Archives of the German National Library of Economics (ZBW)
Retrieved from 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=British_South_Africa_Company&oldid=890942971'
The beginnings of European activity
The arrival of European sea traders at the Guinea coastlands in the 15th century clearly marks a new epoch in their history and in the history of all of western Africa. The pioneers were the Portuguese, southwestern Europeans with the necessary knowledge, experience, and national purpose to embark on the enterprise of developing oceanic trade routes with Africa and Asia. Their main goals were in Asia, but to reach Asia it was necessary to circumnavigate Africa, in the process of which they hoped, among other things, to make contact with Mali and to divert some of the trans-Saharan gold trade from Muslim North Africa to Christian Europe.
The colonization of the Cape Verde Islands, from the 1460s onward, provided bases for trade with the fringes of the Mali empire. The most momentous discovery in western Africa, however, came in 1471, when Portuguese captains first reached the coast of modern Ghana between the mouths of the Ankobra and Volta rivers. It was quickly appreciated that the Akan peoples of this coast had access to supplies of gold, which were plentiful by contemporary European standards, and that they were willing and organized to trade some of this gold for base metals, cloth, and other manufactures. The Portuguese called this coast Mina, “the mine,” while in European languages generally it became known as the Gold Coast.
The wealth obtainable from trade with the Gold Coast was so important for the completion of the Portuguese design to establish regular commerce with Asia by circumnavigating Africa that the Portuguese crown quickly took steps to exclude foreign rivals from the western African trade and to bring it under its direct control. Portugal was not a naturally wealthy nation, however, and its overseas interests had become very widely extended by the beginning of the 16th century. The western African coastlands and their trade were only one element in a system that also embraced the Congo and Angola, Brazil, the East African littoral, and India and the East Indies. By and large it was the trade of the latter that was regarded as the major prize, and elsewhere activities tended to be restricted to those which might strengthen the prosperity of the overseas enterprise as a whole without unduly straining the limited resources, especially perhaps of labour, available for its control and exploitation.
The general strategy in western Africa—as elsewhere in the Portuguese trading empire—was to keep territorial and administrative commitments to the minimum necessary to develop and benefit Portuguese commercial activities that were already in existence. The main interest in western Africa was the gold trade of Mina, and it was there—and virtually there alone—that the Portuguese endeavoured to maintain a positive presence on the mainland. In 1482 they built the strong fort that they called São Jorge da Mina (the modern Elmina Castle) on the shores of the Gold Coast, on land leased from the local Akan, and in subsequent years this was supplemented by the construction of three additional forts, at Axim, Shama, and Accra. The purpose of these forts and their garrisons was to try to ensure that the local people sold their gold only to agents of the Portuguese crown. No other Europeans succeeded in establishing lasting footholds on the Gold Coast before the close of the 16th century, and the Portuguese purpose was largely achieved. The surviving records suggest that up to about 1550 the Portuguese were securing from the Gold Coast on average at least 12,400 ounces of gold each year, a sizable proportion of the production then available to Europe.
In exchange, the Gold Coast peoples needed to be supplied with commodities they desired, and this presented Portugal with a problem, as it was not a major manufacturing nation. The raw iron and copper, metal goods, cloth, and other items that were in demand on the Gold Coast had to be purchased elsewhere. Some of the cloth exported to the Gold Coast was in fact brought from Morocco (and may therefore have been in competition with a trade in cloth that had earlier reached the Akan from the north), and the requirements of their Gold Coast customers were a prime factor in leading the Portuguese to develop relations with the kingdom of Benin and the Niger delta, where further supplies of cloth, and also of beads and slaves that were in demand on the Gold Coast, could be obtained.
At first the Portuguese hoped to control the trade of Benin and surrounding areas by converting the kingdom, or at least its court, to Christianity and turning it into a satellite protectorate of their empire. Although this kind of policy was initially successful elsewhere in Africa, notably in the Kongo (Bakongo) kingdom of northern Angola, the Benin monarchy was powerful enough to reject European pressures and infiltration. From about 1520 onward, the Portuguese were virtually excluded from Benin, and their trade with the Niger delta was conducted from São Tomé and from the other islands of the Gulf of Guinea that they had colonized. This trade was principally in slaves, from the Congo and Angola as well as from the delta, who were employed on plantations to grow tropical produce, sugar in particular, for the European market.
Apart from an abortive attempt to intercept the western trans-Saharan trade from a fort that was erected on the island of Arguin off the coast of Mauritania, the other principal Portuguese activity in western Africa was the trade with the coastlands of Upper Guinea that was conducted by the settlers on the Cape Verde Islands (which, together with Madeira, were also developed as plantation colonies employing African slave labour). The empire of Mali was in decline, but the Portuguese were not strong enough to control trade so far into the interior. What ultimately developed, on the creeks and islands of the coast from the Gambia to Sierra Leone, was a number of informal settlements where traders from the Cape Verde Islands did some trade with Mande merchants and with the local peoples. Gradually they married into the local trading and ruling families and, escaping formal Portuguese control, became agents of the African commercial system who sought to secure the best terms they could from any visiting European trader irrespective of nationality.
It may be doubted whether this first period of European involvement with western Africa, from about 1450 to 1600, had much effect on the course of its history. The only Europeans consistently involved were the Portuguese, who were not strong outside the Gold Coast and who were really only interested in controlling some aspects of trade, and these only in a few selected areas of the coastlands where new opportunities had been opened up for a few members of the ruling and trading classes. Perhaps the main changes were that a few Africans acquired some acquaintance with Christianity and with elements of the Portuguese language—a pidgin variety of which became the lingua franca of coastal commerce for some centuries—and that western African farmers were introduced to some new crops and fruits, usually of tropical American provenance, which they quickly adopted if they were more productive than their established cultigens. For example, corn (maize) was more productive than millet and cassava more productive than yams under certain conditions.
The new era of maritime intercourse with the outside world was probably of marked significance only on the Gold Coast. There new avenues of wealth had been opened up for some of the Akan in trade at the coast. There too a new political problem had emerged of how to ensure regular and profitable commercial dealings with the Europeans, while at the same time preventing the coastal footholds, which the Europeans required as entrepôts, from subverting the sovereignty of the indigenous states. This was a very real problem, because the coastal kingdoms were small and divided among themselves in competition for the trade with the Europeans. Elmina certainly, and to some extent Axim also, did in fact develop independent jurisdictions over the mixed European, African, and mulatto trading communities that developed beneath the walls of the forts. Beyond these, the difficulty of maintaining large and effective forces of European soldiers in the tropics meant that the Portuguese could only exert power through African allies. The coastal people were thus able to maintain the principle that the land on which the forts were built was not ceded, but only leased. If the Portuguese lost their allies’ confidence, the latter could refuse to supply or help defend the forts, or even destroy them altogether (as happened for the first time at Accra in the 1570s).
Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) was a British Overseas bank that was important in introducing modern banking into the countries that emerged from the UK's West African colonies. In 1957 it changed its name to Bank of West Africa, and in 1965 was acquired by Standard Bank.
History[edit]
- 1891 — Elder Dempster shipping magnate Alfred Lewis Jones (born in Carmarthen, Wales in 1845) and George William Neville (born at Richmond, near London in 1852), the local agent of Elder Dempster & Co. of Liverpool, attempted to develop a banking operation along the Guinea coast
- 1892 — African Banking Corporation acquired Elder Dempster's banking operations in Lagos, Nigeria. Within a year they wished to close it down. Instead, they sold the operation to A.L. Jones and Elder Dempster
- 1893 — Elder Dempster helped form Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) which took over the ex-ABC operation in Lagos. Eventually, BBWA established branches in Liverpool, London, and Manchester.
- 1894 — Elder Dempster Co, were appointed agents in Freetown, Sierra Leone and Bathurst, The Gambia for BBWA. BBWA also took over ABC's Tangier branch.
- 1896 — BBWA established a branch in Accra, Ghana. Its main business then was the distribution of silver coins, of which it was the sole supplier. As the only bank in the country at the time, it came to play a unique role in the economy, acting as the Central Bank. In 1902, it opened another branch in Sekondi. It opened an agency in Obuasi in 1905, which it raised to the status of a branch in 1909. In 1906 it opened a branch in Kumasi. British Bank of West Africa expanded its network to cover most of the main business centres in the Gold Coast and went on to dominate commercial banking in Ghana
- 1898 — BBWA established a branch in Freetown, Sierra Leone
- 1902 — BBWA established a branch in Bathurst, The Gambia
- In about 1910 BBWA established a branch in Tenerife, in the Canary Isles
- 1912 — BBWA took over the activities of Bank of Nigeria, which local merchants had established in 1899 or 1902 to create a competitor to BBWA
- 1915 — BBWA established a branch in Douala, The Cameroons, following the Anglo-French invasion
- 1916 — BBWA closed its branch in Douala following Douala's transfer to French administration, but opened an agency in New York City
- 1918 — BBWA opened a branch in Alexandria, Egypt
- 1919 — Lloyds Bank and three other banks became shareholders in BBWA
- 1912 — BBWA re-opened a branch in Douala, French Cameroons, and in Cairo
- 1923 — Standard Bank of South Africa took over BBWA's New York agency. Lloyds Bank acquired Cox & Co, which had branches in Egypt, but was itself a shareholder in BBWA. To avoid competing with itself, Lloyds had BBWA transfer its Egyptian business to Lloyds Bank. In 1926 Lloyds transferred its operations in Egypt to the National Bank of Egypt
- Between 1930 and 1940 BBWA closed most of its branches it had established in Morocco, the Canary Islands and Fernando Po
- In 1937 or so, BBWA established a branch in Hamburg, Germany
- 1953 — BBWA lost its central banking functions in Ghana. The Ghanaian government established the Bank of the Gold Coast to combine commercial banking activities and central banking functions
- In 1954 or so BBWA closed its Hamburg branch, which presumably had been in abeyance during World War II and reopened thereafter
- 1957 — Bank of British West Africa changed its name to Bank of West Africa (BWA)
- 1963 — BWA closed its branch in Tangier
- 1965 — Standard Bank acquired BWA, and renamed it Standard Bank of West Africa. SBWA acquired the Liberian and Nigerian branches of Chase Manhattan Bank in return for Chase taking a 15% stake in Standard Bank, a stake that it sold in the late 1970s. BWA still operated one branch each in the French and British Cameroon Mandates, and in Morocco
- 1969 — Standard Bank merged with Chartered Bank to form Standard Chartered Bank. SBWA spun off Standard Bank of Ghana, Standard Bank Nigeria, and Standard Bank of Sierra Leone, which went on to have separate histories
- 1 January 1985 — the Ghanaian operation became Standard Chartered Bank Ghana, under which name it continues to operate
- 1971 — Standard Bank of Nigeria placed 13% of its share capital with Nigerian investors. After the end of the Nigerian Civil War, Nigeria's military government sought to increase local control of the retail-banking sector. Standard Chartered Bank's investment in Standard Bank Nigeria fell to 38%, and the bank changed its name to First Bank of Nigeria in 1979. Standard Chartered sold its remaining shares in First Bank of Nigeria in 1996. The present Standard Chartered Bank Nigeria, therefore, traces its presence in Nigeria only to 1999, when the bank re-entered Nigeria with a new, wholly owned subsidiary
- The present Standard Chartered Bank Sierra Leone traces its corporate history back to BBWA's commissioning the Elder Dempster as its agents in Freetown in 1894
- Between 1969 and 1974, Standard Bank also closed the branches (Douala and Victoria) in Cameroon that it inherited from BWA
- By 1974 SBWA had only two branches, both in The Gambia, and in 1978, SBWA transferred these two branches to Standard Bank Gambia Ltd. Until 2002, by then Standard Chartered Bank Gambia remained the only bank in The Gambia.
Africa Limited By British Primary Source Review
Sources[edit]
- Baster, A.S.J. 1926/1977. The Imperial Banks. (New York: Arno Press reprint).
- Fry, Richard. 1976. Bankers in West Africa : the story of the Bank of British West Africa Limited. (London: Hutchinson).
External links[edit]
- Documents and clippings about Bank of British West Africa in the 20th Century Press Archives of the German National Library of Economics (ZBW)
Retrieved from 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bank_of_British_West_Africa&oldid=881495964'
School children in Cape Town
Education in South Africa is governed by two national departments, namely the department of Basic Education (DBE), which is responsible for primary and secondary schools, and the department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), which is responsible for tertiary education and vocational training. Prior to 2009, these two departments were represented in a single Department of Education.
The DBE department deals with public schools, private schools (also referred to by the department as independent schools), early childhood development (ECD) centres, and special needs schools. The public schools and private schools are collectively known as ordinary schools, and comprise roughly 97% of schools in South Africa.
The DHET department deals with further education and training (FET) colleges, adult basic education and training (ABET) centres, and higher education (HE) institutions.
The nine provinces in South Africa also have their own education departments that are responsible for implementing the policies of the national department, as well as dealing with local issues.
In 2010, the basic education system comprised 12 644 208 learners, 30 586 schools, and 439 394 teachers.[1] In 2009, the higher education and training system comprised 837 779 students in HE institutions, 420 475 students in state-controlled FET institutions and 297 900 in state-controlled ABET centres.[2]
In 2013, the South African government spent 21% of the national budget on education, Some ten percent of the education budget is for higher education.
- 2Basic education system (primary and secondary schools)
- 2.3School income and expenses
- 3Higher education and training system
- 4History
Structure and policies[edit]
The department of Basic Education is headed by the director-general Hubert Mathanzima Mweli, and its policy is made by the minister Angie Motshekga and the deputy minister Enver Surty. The department of Higher Education and Training is headed by the director-general Mary Metcalfe, and its policy is made by the minister Naledi Pandor and the deputy minister Buti Manamela.
Both these departments are funded from central governmenttaxes. The department of Basic Education pays a portion of teachers' salaries in government schools, whereas independent schools are funded privately. Government schools may under certain circumstances supplement their funds through parent contributions.
Basic education system (primary and secondary schools)[edit]
The DBE officially groups grades into two 'bands' called General Education and Training (GET), which includes grade 0 plus grades 1 to 9, and Further Education and Training (FET), which includes grades 10-12 as well as non-higher education vocational training facilities.
The GET (General Education and Training band) is subdivided further into 'phases' called the Foundation Phase (grade 0 plus grade 1 to 3), the Intermediate Phase (grades 4 to 6), and the Senior Phase (grades 7 to 9).
The administrative structure of most ordinary schools in South Africa do not reflect the division of bands and phases, however. For historical reasons, most schools are either 'primary' schools (grade R plus grades 1 to 7) or 'secondary' schools, also known as high schools (grades 8 to 12).
Optional grades[edit]
Some home schools and private schools offer the option to complete an additional year after grade 12, sometimes known as grade 13 or 'post-matric'. The South African governmental school system does not have a grade 13, but it forms part of non-South African curriculums that are sometimes followed by private schools in South Africa.[3][4]
The DBE's Foundation Phase includes a pre-school grade known as grade R, for 'reception'. Grade R is compulsory, but not all primary schools offer grade R. Grade R may also be attended at pre-school facilities. Other grades that can be completed at a pre-school centre include grade 00 and grade 000 (although the 000 and 00 designations are not universally applied). Grade R is sometimes called Grade 0 (pronounced 'grade nought'),[5][6] particularly in previously white schools, where the usage was once common.
Learner ratios[edit]
According to the DBE's 2010 statistics report (published in 2012), on average there are 30 learners per teacher, 480 learners per school, and 16 teachers per school. The ratio of learners per teacher is roughly the same in all provinces, but the ratio of learners per school varies per province. For example, in Gauteng there are 800 learners per school and 28 teachers per school, whereas in the Eastern Cape there 350 learners per school and 12 teachers per school.
Updated 2013 statistics (published in 2015) is available.[7]
School income and expenses[edit]
Schools in South Africa receive a grant from government for their operational costs, such as maintaining the grounds, administrative costs, salaries, books and educational materials, and extramural activities. Most schools supplement the government grant with other streams of income, such as school fees paid by parents, fundraising events, and receiving donations.Generally, higher school fees prevent poorer children from attending affluent schools. There is no limit to the amount of the fees that a school may set. Parents may apply to the school for full or partial reduction of school fees, and many affluent schools do provide financial assistance to a small number of learners (for example, if the parents are alumni), but it is not a legal requirement.[8][9]
Children at South African schools are usually required to wear school uniforms, which can be expensive and are not provided for free, although it is often possible to buy them second-hand. Most schools offer extra mural activities such as a variety of sports and cultural activities, which requires money to maintain. Many schools maintain their own sports fields as well.
The size of the grant paid by government is determined largely by the poverty level of the neighbourhood in which the school is situated, as well as unemployment rate and general education rate of the population in that neighbourhood. Consequently, schools in more affluent areas have to raise more money from other sources to maintain the same standard of education, but schools from affluent areas often have so much additional income that their standard of education is much higher than that of less affluent schools anyway.
The size of the government grant per child depends on the 'quintille' of the school. In 2009, schools in quintille 1 (the poorest) and quintille 2 received R807 and R740 per child per year, respectively, where as schools in quintille4 and quintille 5 (the richest) received R404 and R134 per child per year. Schools in quintille 1-3 may apply for classification as a 'No Fee' school. 5% of all schools are quintille 5 schools, and 15% of all schools are quintille 4 schools.[10]
Sample school fees[edit]
Schools are not required to publish their school fees publicly and many schools are secretive about it, but here are some examples of school fees in non-private schools in South Africa:
- The Settler's High, Bellville: R15200 per child per year[11]
- Monument Park High, Kraaifontein: R9000 per child per year[12]
Poverty and school fees[edit]
Schools may not refuse admission to children who live in the immediate vicinity of the school. Schools may not refuse entry to children or refuse to hand over report cards even if their parents neglect to pay the school fees, but schools are permitted to sue parents for non-payment of school fees.
Since 1996, children whose parents are very poor are legally exempt from some or all school fees. Since 1998, the formula is as follows: If the combined annual income of the parents is less than ten times the annual school fee, the child is legally exempt from paying school fees. If the income is more than ten times the school fee but less than thirty times the school fee, the child is legally entitled to a specific reduction in school fees. In practice, these regulations help only very poor families, and not working-class and middle-income families.
Orphans and children of parents who receive poverty-linked social grants are also exempt from paying school fees.[10]
Since 2006 the Education department offers the following incentive to the poorest 40% of schools: if the school charges no school fees, the education department increases the grant to make up for the lack of income from school fees. It was originally planned to increase this incentive to the poorest 60% of schools by 2009. The incentive only applies to children in the GED band, and children who wish to complete grade 10-12 must still pay the full fee.
In 2008, some 5 million learners in 14 264 schools benefited from the No Fee school programme, and most of those learners were in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo provinces. Not all schools who qualify for this incentive make use of it.
Private schools[edit]
Private schools, also known as independent schools, are schools that are not owned by the state. They are usually owned and operated by a trust, church or community, or by a for-profit company. Not all private schools in South Africa charge high school fees. Certain private schools also receive a grant from the state, depending on the community served and fees charged.[13]
Higher education and training system[edit]
A graph mapping out the National Qualification Frameworks (NQF) and how they relate to different educational options within the South African educational system in 2017. NQFs are a key component of the South African higher education system.
For university entrance, a 'Matriculation Endorsement' is required, although some universities do set their own additional academic requirements. South Africa has a vibrant higher sector, with more than a million students enrolled in the country’s universities, colleges and universities of technology. All the universities are autonomous, reporting to their own councils rather than government. The National Qualifications Framework (NQF) system of administering higher education broadly in the country is run by the South African Qualifications Authority.
Restructuring of universities and technikons[edit]
The Extension of Universities Act of 1959 made provision for separate universities for separate races. In addition, the independent homelands were given universities of their own. After the re-incorporation of the independent homelands, there were 36 universities and technikons in South Africa, often in close proximity and offering the same courses.[14]
In 1994, the government embarked on a restructure of the universities and technikons by a series of mergers and incorporations. This was completed by January 2005. It created 22 new institutions from the previous 36. Ten of the universities got new names.
History[edit]
1806 to 1900[edit]
The earliest European schools in South Africa were established in the Cape Colony in the late seventeenth century by Dutch Reformed Church elders committed to biblical instruction, which was necessary for church confirmation. In rural areas, itinerant teachers (meesters) taught basic literacy and math skills. British mission schools proliferated after 1799, when the first members of the London Missionary Society arrived in the Cape Colony.[15]
Language soon became a sensitive issue in education. At least two dozen English-language schools operated in rural areas of the Cape Colony by 1827, but their presence rankled among devout Afrikaners, who considered the English language and curriculum irrelevant to rural life and Afrikaner values. Throughout the nineteenth century, Afrikaners resisted government policies aimed at the spread of the English language and British values, and many educated their children at home or in the churches.[15]
After British colonial officials began encouraging families to emigrate from Britain to the Cape Colony in 1820, the Colonial Office screened applicants for immigration for background qualifications. They selected educated families, for the most part, to establish a British presence in the Cape Colony. After their arrival, these parents placed a high priority on education. Throughout this time, most religious schools in the eastern Cape accepted Xhosa children who applied for admission; in Natal many other Nguni-speaking groups sent their children to mission schools after the mid-nineteenth century. The government also financed teacher training classes for Africans as part of its pacification campaign throughout the nineteenth century.[15]
By 1877 some 60 percent of white school-age children in Natal were enrolled in school, as were 49 percent in the Cape Colony. After the Boer War (ended 1902) in the former Afrikaner republics, however, enrolments remained low—only 12 percent in the Orange Free State and 8 percent in the Transvaal—primarily the result of Afrikaner resistance to British education. Enrolments in these republics increased after the government of the Union agreed to the use of Afrikaans in the schools and to allow Afrikaner parents greater control over primary and secondary education.[15]
By the late nineteenth century, three types of schools were receiving government assistance—ward schools, or small rural schools generally employing one teacher; district schools, providing primary-level education to several towns in an area; and a few secondary schools in larger cities. But during the last decades of that century, all four provinces virtually abolished African enrolment in government schools. African children attended mission schools, for the most part, and were taught by clergy or by lay teachers, sometimes with government assistance.[15]
Higher education was generally reserved for those who could travel to Europe, but in 1829 the government established the multiracial South African College, which later became the University of Cape Town. Religious seminaries accepted a few African applicants as early as 1841. In 1852 the independent state of Transvaal and in 1854 the Orange Free State established their own institutions of higher learning in Dutch. The government established Grey College—later the University of the Orange Free State—in Bloemfontein in 1855 and placed it under the supervision of the Dutch Reformed Church. The Grey Institute was established in Port Elizabeth in 1856; Graaff-Reinet College was founded in 1860. The Christian College was founded at Potchefstroom in 1869 and was later incorporated into the University of South Africa and renamed Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.[15]
1900 to 1948[edit]
Following the British victory in the South African War, the British High Commissioner for Southern Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, brought thousands of teachers from Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to instil the English language and British cultural values, especially in the two former Afrikaner republics. To counter the British influence, a group of Afrikaner churches proposed an education program, Christian National Education, to serve as the core of the school curriculum. The government initially refused to fund schools adopting this program, but Jan C. Smuts, the Transvaal leader who later became prime minister, was strongly committed to reconciliation between Afrikaners and English speakers; he favoured local control over many aspects of education. Provincial autonomy in education was strengthened in the early twentieth century, and all four provincial governments used government funds primarily to educate whites.[15]
The National Party (NP) was able to capitalise on the fear of racial integration in the schools to build its support. The NP's narrow election victory in 1948 gave Afrikaans new standing in the schools and, after that, all high-school graduates were required to be proficient in Afrikaans and English. The NP government also reintroduced Christian National Education as the guiding philosophy of education.[15]
1948 to 1974[edit]
Before 1953, many black people attended schools set up by religious organizations. These schools provided schooling of the same quality that white children received in state schools. Following the Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953 the government tightened its control over religious high schools by eliminating almost all financial aid, forcing many churches to sell their schools to the government or close them entirely.[16]
The South African government implemented an education system called Christian National Education (CNE). The basis of this system is that a person's social responsibilities and political opportunities are defined by that person's ethnic identity.
Although CNE advanced principles of racial inferiority, it promoted teaching of cultural diversity and enforced mother-tongue instruction in the first years of primary school. The government gave strong management control to the school boards, who were elected by the parents in each district.[15]
In 1959, the Extension of University Education Act prohibited established universities from accepting most black students, although the government did create universities for black, coloured, and Indian students.[16]
The number of schools for blacks increased during the 1960s, but their curriculum was designed to prepare children for menial jobs. Per capita government spending on black education slipped to one-tenth of spending on whites in the 1970s. Black schools had inferior facilities, teachers, and textbooks.[15]
1974 to 1983[edit]
In 1974, the Minister of Bantu Education and Development issued a decree commonly known as the 'Afrikaans medium decree' in which the use of both English and Afrikaans was made compulsory in black secondary schools.[17] In this decree, physical science and practical subjects would be taught in English, mathematics and social science subjects would be taught in Afrikaans, and music and cultural subjects would be taught in the learner's native language. The Minister said that the reason for this decree was to ensure that black people can communicate effectively with English and Afrikaans speaking white people.
This decree was unpopular with learners and teachers alike, particularly in towns like the Johannesburg township of Soweto, where practically no one spoke Afrikaans. Tensions over language in education erupted into violence on 16 June 1976, when students took to the streets in Soweto and eventually in other towns and cities in the country. This is infamously known as the Soweto Uprising. When students and those able to take a stand, demanded to be taught in their mother tongue. Many were killed and injured that day due to police intervention, they are remembered as martyrs. Schools were vandalized and teachers left unable to teach and students were unable to come to school.
1984 to 1990[edit]
The National Policy for General Affairs Act (No. 76) of 1984 provided some improvements in black education but maintained the overall separation called for by the Bantu education system.
The Department of Education and Training was responsible for black education outside the homelands. Each of the three houses of parliament—for whites, coloureds, and Indians—had an education department for one racial group. Each of the ten homelands had its own education department. In addition, several other government departments managed specific aspects of education.[15]
Education was compulsory for all racial groups, but at different ages, and the law was enforced differently. Whites were required to attend school between the ages of seven and sixteen. Black children were required to attend school from age seven until the equivalent of seventh grade or the age of sixteen. This law was enforced only weakly and not at all in areas where schools were unavailable. For Asians and coloured children, education was compulsory between the ages of seven and fifteen.[15]
Teacher-pupil ratios in primary schools averaged 1:18 in white schools, 1:24 in Asian schools, 1:27 in coloured schools, and 1:39 in black schools. Moreover, whereas 96 percent of all teachers in white schools had teaching certificates, only 15 percent of teachers in black schools were certified. Secondary-school pass rates for black pupils in the nationwide, standardised high-school graduation exams were less than one-half the pass rate for whites.[15]
1990 to 1993[edit]
The white education system was restructured, in anticipation of democracy, by the apartheid government. From the beginning of 1991, white schools were required to select one of four 'Models': A, B, C, or D. 'Model C' was a semi-private structure, with decreased funding from the state, and greatly increased autonomy for schools. Although most white schools opted for the status quo, by 1993, due to government policy, 96% of white public schools became 'Model C' schools.[18]
Although the form of 'Model C' was abolished by the post-apartheid government, the term is still commonly used to describe former whites-only government schools, as of 2013.
1994 to 1997[edit]
Under Apartheid South Africa, there were eight education departments that followed different curricula and offered different standards of learning quality. This included nationwide departments for coloured people, for Indians and for black people, a department for independent schools, and provincial departments for white people in each of the former four provinces. Some of the Bantustans that were incorporated back into South Africa in 1994 also had their own education departments.
In terms of the Interim Constitution, the Mandela government restructured these departments as well as tertiary education departments, splitting responsibilities between nine newly formed provincial education departments and a single national education department. It also set about reforming the educational system by first removing all racially offensive and outdated content and then introducing continuous assessment into schools.[19]
The South African Schools Act, 1996 was promulgated to 'provide for a uniform system for the organisation, governance and funding of schools'.
1997 to 2005[edit]
In 1997, the government launched its new education system called Curriculum 2005, which would be based on 'outcomes based education' (OBE). By 2006 it was clear that OBE as a social experiment had failed, and it was quietly shelved.[20]
2006 until now - use of English[edit]
South Africa has 11 official languages.[21] and the first year of schooling is provided in all these home languages.[22]
Before 2009, schools serving non-English speakers had to teach English as a subject only from grade 3 and all subjects were taught in English from grade 4 (except in Afrikaans language schools). Since 2009, all schools teach English as a subject from grade 1 and all subjects are taught in English from grade 4. Afrikaans language schools are an exception, in that all subjects (other than other languages) are taught in Afrikaans.[23]
Performance[edit]
An independent study by Stellenbosch University researchers found that undue union influence and 'critical educational factors', including weak institutional functionality, uneducated teachers, and insufficient learning time, were responsible for the poor state of South Africa. South Africa has a high dropout rate due to reasons of poor academic performance,teen pregnancy and crime. [24]
Violence[edit]
The South African Human Rights Commission has found that 40% of children interviewed said they had been the victims of crime at school. More than a fifth of sexual assaults on South African children were found to have taken place in schools.[25] Gang fighting in schools, whereby dangerous weapons which include guns, are used, has also become popular in recent years, specifically in Cape Town, Western Cape.The Education Department and the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention initiated a program named Hlayiseka, the purpose of which is to staunch the epidemic of school violence in South African schools.[26]
Map of South Africa
References[edit]
- ^'Photographic image'. Education.gov.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 2 May 2013.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
- ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 2 May 2013.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
- ^'High School - Roseway Waldorf School'. Rosewaywaldorf.co.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^http://www.sprogs.co.za/resources/kids-questions-answers/child-‘school’-gr-000-send-he’s-6-turning-7-gr-1
- ^'Is there a difference between Gr0 and Gr00 ? - Sprogs'. Sprogs.co.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^'Education Statistics 2013'(PDF). Gov.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^'Education Policy: School Fees'. Etu.org.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^[1]Archived 28 January 2013 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ ab'NO fees Schools in South Africa - Policy Brief 7'(PDF). Create-rpc.org. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^'SCHOOL FEES 2013'(PDF). Settlers.org.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^'Monument Park School fees (Afrikaans)'. Hsmp.co.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 23 April 2013. Retrieved 6 May 2013.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
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- ^ abcdefghijklmSouth Africa country study. Library of CongressFederal Research Division. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ abOcampo, Lizet (19 September 2004). 'Global Perspectives on Human Language: The South African Context - Timeline of Education and Apartheid'. stanford.edu. Retrieved 26 August 2017.
- ^Boddy, Alistair (16 June 1976). 'The Afrikaans Medium Decree & the Soweto Uprising'. africanhistory.about.com. Retrieved 26 August 2017.
- ^''Model C' is the model to emulate - 1 February 2011 - South AfricanInstitute of Race Relations'. Sairr.org.za. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^'Curriculum reform in South Africa : a critical analysis of outcomes-based education'(PDF). Repository.up.ac.za. Retrieved 26 August 2017.
- ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 7 May 2013.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
- ^'South Africa: Foundation Phase Learners to Take More Subjects'. Allafrica.com. 29 June 2011. Retrieved 26 August 2017.
- ^'Education | Statistics South Africa'. Statssa.gov.za. Statistics South Africa. Retrieved 26 August 2017.
- ^Megan Doidge (2014). 'Factors influencing Grade 7 teachers' implementation of outcomes-based approaches in the National Curriculum when teaching 'Human Reproduction''(PDF). Doctors Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand. Retrieved 27 August 2017.
- ^Masondo, Sipho (31 May 2016). 'Education in South Africa: A system in crisis'. CityPress. Retrieved 4 May 2017.
- ^Violence rife in S Africa schools. (2008, March 12). BBC News Online. London.
- ^'Children of wrath'. Mail & Guardian. 22 August 2008. Retrieved 6 May 2013.
External links[edit]
Further reading[edit]
- The Next Twenty-Five Years: Affirmative Action in Higher Education in the United States and South Africa. David L. Featherman, et al. University of Michigan Press. 2009. 416 pages. ISBN978-0-472-11705-5
- Estudiantes negros en Sudáfrica alzan la voz y piden una verdadera transformación. Norimitsu Onishi, The New York Times, September 11, 2015.
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